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This Comment looks closely at the reasoning behind two recent federal 
court opinions granting transgender prisoners access to hormone therapy 
and sex-reassignment surgery. Although both opinions were decided under 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, which does 
not expressly prohibit discrimination based on gender identity, a careful look 
at the courts’ reasoning suggests that they were influenced by the apparent 
discrimination against the transgender plaintiffs. This Comment argues that 
future transgender prisoners may be able to develop an antidiscrimination 
doctrine within the Eighth Amendment by framing their Eighth Amendment 
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 “I am Chelsea Manning.”1 With those words, Army Private Bradley 
Manning announced to the world that she would be transitioning from male 
to female. Going forward, Manning indicated that she would like to be known 
as “Chelsea” and referred to by female pronouns.2 Manning’s public 
statement on August 22, 2013, came one day after she was sentenced to 
thirty-five years in prison for leaking classified government documents to 
WikiLeaks.3 Manning has been in the media spotlight since her arrest in May 
2010, and her recent transition has called national attention to some of the 
problems facing transgender prisoners in America.4 
 
1 Lenny Bernstein & Julie Tate, Manning to Live as Woman in Prison, WASH. POST, Aug. 
23, 2013, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
2 Id. at A6.  
3 Charlie Savage & Emmarie Huetteman, Manning Sentenced to 35 Years for a Pivotal 
Leak of U.S. Files, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2013, at A1. 
4 Transgender prisoner health care has received increased attention in the media. For 
example, it was featured on an episode of the popular Netflix series Orange is the New Black 
in July 2013. Orange Is the New Black: Lesbian Request Denied, NETFLIX (July 11, 2013), 
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There is limited data on the number of transgender5 people in the 
nation’s various prisons and jails,6 but transgender people are incarcerated at 
a disproportionately high rate.7 Transgender individuals face harsh and 
 
http://www.netflix.com (Netflix web series). In the show, transgender actress Laverne Cox 
portrays a male-to-female prisoner housed in a female prison, whose hormone therapy was cut 
off due to budget cuts. Id. 
5 In this Comment, “sex” refers to “the anatomical and physiological distinctions between 
men and women.” Stevie V. Tran & Elizabeth M. Glazer, Transgenderless, 35 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 399, 399 n.1 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[G]ender-nonconforming” 
refers to the “failure of an individual to behave in conformity with the cultural expectations 
associated with that individual’s sex (or the sex that others assume applies to that individual).” 
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The term “transgender” is used to describe the “broad 
range of people whose gender identity or expression does not conform to the social 
expectations for their assigned sex at birth.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
“Transgender” is used as an “umbrella term” to describe “many different ways of being.” Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Thus, someone who is gender-nonconforming could be 
considered transgender, but someone who is transgender may not necessarily be considered 
gender-nonconforming.” Id. For a discussion of the use of qualifying footnotes on terminology 
related to sex and gender—such as this one—in legal scholarship, in “which the author 
circumscribes the individuals whose protection the article addresses,” see Elizabeth M. Glazer, 
Sexual Reorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 997, 1062 (2012). 
6 A 2009 study by researchers at the University of California, Irvine, identified 332 
transgender inmates out of about 155,000 inmates housed in California men’s prisons, which 
is roughly 0.2%. LORI SEXTON ET AL., WHERE THE MARGINS MEET: A DEMOGRAPHIC 
ASSESSMENT OF TRANSGENDER INMATES IN MEN’S PRISONS 8–9 & 34 n.7 (June 10, 2009), 
available at http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2013/06/A-Demographic-Assessment-
of-Transgender-Inmates-in-Mens-Prisons.pdf (citing the California Department of 
Corrections and Rehabilitation monthly population report from April 30, 2008, which 
identified 155,416 incarcerated men. DATA ANALYSIS UNIT, DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 
MONTHLY REPORT OF POPULATION AS OF MIDNIGHT APRIL 30, 2008, at 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly
/TPOP1A/TPOP1Ad0804.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M4GP-9GP3), archived at http:// 
perma.cc/T94Y-MZTL). However, the study acknowledges that “there were possibly 
transgender inmates who were not” included in the study. Id. at 9. 
7 See Franklin H. Romeo, Beyond a Medical Model: Advocating for a New Conception of 
Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 713, 71315 (2005). According to 
the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, a self-reported survey of transgender 
individuals across the country conducted by the National Center for Transgender Equality and 
the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, the incarceration rate for transgender individuals is 
16%. JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL. & NAT’L GAY AND 
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSGENDER 
DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 163 (2011), available at http://www.thetaskforce.
org/downloads/reports/reports/ntds_full.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/M64N-SAEP. The 
rate was even higher for transgender respondents of color: 47% for African American 
respondents and 30% for American Indian respondents. Id. Moreover, male-to-female 
respondents reported a higher incarceration rate (21%) than female-to-male respondents 
(10%). Id. By comparison, the Department of Justice reports that among the general American 
population in 2001, 4.9% of males and 0.5% of females had been incarcerated at some point 
in their lives. THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
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pervasive discrimination in almost all aspects of social lifeeducation, 
employment, housing, public accommodations, health care, and law 
enforcement.8 As a result of this harassment, many transgender people live 
in poverty.9 The combination of high poverty rates and employment 
discrimination has led to a greater proportion of transgender people 
participating in criminalized economies compared to the general population, 
and thus, a disproportionate representation of transgender people in the 
criminal justice system and in prisons.10 
One of the biggest obstacles transgender people face in prison is 
obtaining access to gender-confirming health care, which may include 
hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery.11 Not all transgender prisoners 
request or require such medical treatment, but for some prisoners, denial of 
hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery can lead to serious mental 
health problems, such as depression or anxiety, and even attempts at suicide 
and self-castration.12 Writer and activist Janet Mock explains on her website 
that for some people “[t]hese surgeries and care are vitally necessary 
(whether you exist in or outside of prison walls), and it is a discussion 
between a patient and their doctor, not between anyone else.”13 
 
SPECIAL REPORT: PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN THE U.S. POPULATION, 19742001 1 
(2003), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P2U2-4ZQC. However, the Department of Justice survey includes only 
prisons, not jails, so the actual incarceration rate of the overall population is somewhat higher. 
See GRANT ET AL., supra, at163.  
8 GRANT ET AL., supra note 7, at 36; Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled 
Exclusions: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender 
People, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 3738 (2000); Romeo, supra note 7, at 71314.  
9 See GRANT ET AL., supra note 7, at 2; Romeo, supra note 7, at 71314.  
10 See supra note 7. 
11 “[G]ender-confirming healthcare is an individualized treatment that differs according to 
the needs and pre-existing conditions of individual transgender people.” Dean Spade, 
Medicaid Policy & Gender-Confirming Healthcare for Trans People: An Interview with 
Advocates, 8 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 497, 497 (2010). Depending on the individual, gender-
confirming health care may include hormone therapy treatment or any of a number of surgical 
procedures. Id. at 498. Some transgender people may undergo no medical treatment at all in 
relation to their expression of gender identity. Id. at 497–98. 
12 See Dean Spade, Documenting Gender, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 731, 755 (2008) (“Depression, 
anxiety, and suicidality are conditions commonly tied to the unmet need for gender-confirming 
medical care.”); see also Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2012) 
(discussing transgender plaintiff’s attempts at self-castration and suicide while incarcerated); 
Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 244–45 (D. Mass. 2012) (discussing transgender 
plaintiff’s history of suicidality and one attempt at self-castration while in custody).  
13 Janet Mock, Chelsea Manning & the Battle for Trans Inclusive Healthcare Without 
Bias, JANET MOCK (Aug. 22, 2013), http://janetmock.com/2013/08/22/chelsea-manning-
transgender-healthcare/, archived at http://perma.cc/4DLK-39M8. 
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In many states, laws and prison policies pose serious barriers for 
prisoners seeking hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery.14 First, a 
prison doctor must diagnose the prisoner with a medical condition under the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. In addition to 
providing a medical diagnosis, the doctor must also deem hormone therapy 
or sex-reassignment surgery a necessary treatment for that condition and 
assert that there are no adequate alternatives.15  
Under the Fourth Edition of the Manual, this condition was called 
“gender identity disorder” (GID).16 In 2013, the editors published the Fifth 
Edition of the Manual in which they relabeled GID as “gender dysphoria” 
and removed the condition from the chapter on sexual dysfunctions, placing 
it in its own chapter.17 Unlike the criteria for GID, which emphasized gender 
cross-identification, gender dysphoria emphasizes gender incongruence.18 
Gender dysphoria is defined, in part, as a “marked incongruence” between a 
person’s experienced or expressed gender and that person’s assigned gender 
at birth.19 Because most of the cases and literature discussed in this Comment 
refer to GID, this Comment will use the phrase GID when discussing the 
medical diagnosis, except where the newer definition is relevant.  
As part of Manning’s announcement that she would be transitioning 
from male to female, Manning publicly stated her intention to seek hormone 
therapy while imprisoned.20 Her request created a new dilemma for the 
United States Department of Defense, which is caught between providing her 
with adequate medical care for a diagnosed disorder and adhering to the 
military’s longstanding policy banning transgender people from serving in 
the military.21 When Manning filed her request for hormone therapy and 
 
14 Tracy Clark-Flory, America’s Prisons Fail Transgender Inmates, SALON (Aug. 23, 
2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/08/23/americas_prisons_fail_transgender_
inmates/, archived at http://perma.cc/QM9G-EU3U. 
15 To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must show that the desired 
course of treatment is medically necessary, which requires showing that no adequate 
alternatives exist. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d. 63, 86 (1st Cir. 2014). 
16 AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 493 (4th ed. rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
17 Mark Moran, New Gender Dysphoria Criteria Replace GID, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS (Apr. 
5, 2013), http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/doi/full/10.1176%2Fappi.pn.2013.4a19, 
archived at http://perma.cc/M525-PB44. 
18 Id. 
19 See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 451–59 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. 
20 Bernstein & Tate, supra note 1, at A1. 
21 See Helene Cooper, Pentagon Weighs Transfer of Chelsea Manning to Civilian Facility, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/15/us/pentagon-weighs-
transfer-of-chelsea-manning-to-civilian-facility.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2S7W-
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permission to live as a woman, the Army attempted to transfer her to a 
civilian prison that could better provide the requested treatment.22 In July 
2014, the Federal Bureau of Prisons rejected the Army’s transfer request.23 
Subsequently, the Department of Defense approved the Army’s 
recommendation that Manning begin “a rudimentary level of gender 
treatment,” which could include allowing Manning to dress in female 
clothing and receive hormone treatments.24 In February 2015, the 
commandant of the Fort Leavenworth military prison where Manning is held 
approved adding hormone treatments to Manning’s treatment plan.25 
The Department of Defense is not the first agency to confront the issue 
of how to provide adequate care for transgender prisoners; many state 
departments of corrections have had to address this question, as well. In fact, 
several federal courts have recently ruled in favor of transgender inmates 
seeking access to gender-confirming health care from state departments of 
corrections, holding that prison officials’ denial of such treatment for those 
who need it violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments.26 Although these decisions provide medical relief for the 
individual plaintiffs who suffer from severe gender dysphoria, they do not 
address the underlying discriminatory nature of such policies. In Manning’s 
case, for example, the military’s ban on hormone therapy stems from its 
 
3MFG (“In the American military, transgender service members can be summarily dismissed, 
as Defense Department guidelines describe transgender people as sexual deviants and their 
condition as ‘paraphilia,’ with its connotations of the atypical and extreme.”). 
22 Id. 
23 Associated Press, Manning’s Gender Treatments to Be Begun by the Military, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2014, at A15. 
24 Associated Press, Chelsea Manning to Begin Gender Treatment in Military Custody, 
N.Y. POST (July 17, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://nypost.com/2014/07/17/chelsea-manning-to-
begin-gender-treatment-in-military-custody/, archived at http://perma.cc/5L42-8JZF. 
Bernstein & Tate, supra note 1, at A6. 
25 Tom Vanden Brook, Army Will Pay for Manning to Become a Woman, USA TODAY, 
Feb. 13, 2015, at A1 (quoting a February 5 memorandum from Colonel Erica Nelson, 
commandant of the Fort Leavenworth Disciplinary Barracks in Kansas, as stating “After 
carefully considering the recommendation that (hormone therapy) is medically appropriate 
and necessary, and weighing all associated safety and security risks presented, I approve 
adding (hormone treatment) to Inmate Manning’s treatment plan.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
26 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011); De’lonta v. Clarke, No. 7:11-cv-00257, 
2013 WL 4584684, at *1 (W.D. Va. Aug. 28, 2013); Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 
198 (D. Mass. 2012); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252 (D. Mass. 2012); Brugliera 
v. Comm’r of Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-40323-JLT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131002 at *1 
(D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2009).  
5. HALBACH (FINAL TO PRINTER) 7/20/2016 
2015] FRAMING A NARRATIVE OF DISCRIMINATION 469 
broader discriminatory policy forbidding transgender prisoners from serving 
in the military.27 
Typically, claims of discrimination against a class of people are litigated 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, 
federal courts have been generally unwilling to rule in favor of transgender 
prisoners seeking gender-confirming health care under the Equal Protection 
Clause. This Comment argues that transgender prisoners may be able to 
develop a doctrine within the Eighth Amendment to litigate their 
discrimination claims in the context of prison health care. This Comment 
looks closely at the reasoning in two recent transgender prisoner health care 
opinions: Fields v. Smith28 and Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II).29 The courts’ 
Eighth Amendment analyses in these cases were seemingly influenced by 
concerns about equal protection and discrimination against transgender 
prisoners. This Comment suggests that transgender prisoners should use the 
analyses in these opinions as examples of how to frame future Eighth 
Amendment claims around facts that show discrimination. 
Part I briefly explains the traditional strategy for litigating 
discrimination claims—the Equal Protection Clause—and discusses why it 
is not likely to be a successful strategy for transgender prisoners seeking 
gender-confirming health care. Part II describes the most common litigation 
strategy used in transgender prisoner health care cases—the Eighth 
Amendment—and discusses some of the criticisms of this doctrine. Part III 
analyzes the opinions in Fields and Kosilek II to show how the courts’ 
decisions under the Eighth Amendment were influenced by equal protection 
principles. Part IV argues that transgender plaintiffs have an opportunity to 
develop a new discrimination doctrine within the Eighth Amendment. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL STRATEGY FOR LITIGATING DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
Claims of discrimination are typically litigated under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Although this may be a losing strategy for transgender 
prisoners seeking access to gender-confirming health care, the underlying 
principles of equal protection analysis may be useful. 
 
27 See Cooper, supra note 21; Lisa Leff, Transgender Military Troop Ban Faces Scrutiny, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2014, 10:23 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/03/13/transgender-troop-ban_n_4956528.html, archived at http://perma.cc/REL2-BR
UF. 
28 653 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2011). 
29 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. Mass. 2012). 
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A. THE EQUAL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK 
The Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”30 The 
essential thrust of this clause is “that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike.”31 The Equal Protection Clause applies to all state and federal 
government actions,32 including the informal policies of state departments of 
corrections.33 The Supreme Court has developed different tiers of judicial 
scrutiny for discriminatory laws or governmental acts that single out a class 
of people for differential treatment based on the nature of that classification. 
The Court applies the highest level of scrutiny to those laws that burden a 
fundamental right or target a suspect class.34 
If the law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, 
then the Court applies the more deferential “rational basis” standard of 
review.35 Most laws withstand rational basis review because a court will 
uphold the law so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
31 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
32 See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498500 (1954) (extending the requirements of 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal government through 
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause); see also DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of 
Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (holding that only affirmative state acts can constitute 
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Clause, not the state’s 
failure to act). 
33 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 502, 515 (2005) (holding that equal protection 
challenges to the California Department of Corrections’ unwritten policy of racially 
segregating prisoners should be reviewed with strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection 
Clause). 
34 Laws that burden a fundamental right or target a “suspect class,” such as classifications 
based on race, receive “strict scrutiny.” See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505 (“[A]ll racial 
classifications [imposed by government] . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under 
strict scrutiny.” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Such laws must be narrowly tailored to a compelling 
governmental interest in order to pass strict scrutiny. Id. (“Under strict scrutiny, the 
government has the burden of proving that racial classifications ‘are narrowly tailored 
measures that further compelling governmental interests.’”) Id. (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S. at 
227). Classifications based on gender receive a lower level of scrutiny, called “intermediate 
scrutiny.” Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the majority applies “an elevated or ‘intermediate’ level scrutiny”). In order to meet the 
intermediate scrutiny standard, such laws must be substantially related to an important 
governmental interest. Id. at 197 (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives.”). 
35 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
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interest.36 Under rational basis review, courts will generally not consider 
whether the actual purpose of the law is the same as the stated governmental 
interest.37 However, the Supreme Court has consistently held that “if the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it 
must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically 
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”38 The 
Court further held in Romer v. Evans that animus alone does not justify 
singling out a group of people for discriminatory treatment.39 Courts apply 
“a more searching form of rational basis review” to such laws that exhibit a 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group.40 Some scholars refer to this 
more rigorous standard of rational basis review as “rational basis with bite.”41 
B. EQUAL PROTECTION IS A LOSING STRATEGY FOR TRANSGENDER 
PRISONERS 
Courts have consistently applied the rational basis standard of review to 
equal protection claims brought by transgender prisoners.42 At this time, there 
 
36 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“[I]f a law neither burdens a fundamental 
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears 
a rational relation to some legitimate end.”); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 
(2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Laws such as economic or tax legislation that are 
scrutinized under rational basis review normally pass constitutional muster . . . .”). 
37 See Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (“[B]ecause we never require a legislature to 
articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes 
whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the 
legislature.”); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (stating that equal protection “does 
not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker 
actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification”); 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7 (1981) (“In equal protection 
analysis, this Court will assume that the objectives articulated by the legislature are actual 
purposes of the statute, unless an examination of the circumstances forces us to conclude that 
they ‘could not have been a goal of the legislation.’” (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 
U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975))). 
38 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis omitted); see City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (holding that “irrational 
prejudice” against the mentally disabled is not a legitimate governmental purpose). 
39 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (The Colorado state constitutional amendment permitting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation “seems inexplicable by anything but animus 
toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”). 
40 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
41 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923, 
928 (2010) (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
680 (3d ed. 2006)). 
42 See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 867–68 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (applying 
rational basis review to plaintiff’s challenge of a state law preventing treatment of gender 
identity disorder to inmates because there was no suspect classification at issue); Battista v. 
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is no indication that courts are willing to extend heightened scrutiny to 
classifications based on gender identity, either by recognizing transgender 
people as a suspect class or by squeezing transgender people into 
classifications based on sex. 
Transgender people do not constitute a suspect class, and it is not likely 
the Supreme Court will recognize them as such anytime soon.43 The Court 
currently recognizes five suspect classifications that receive heightened 
scrutiny: race,44 national origin,45 alienage,46 sex,47 and nonmarital 
parentage.48 The Court has not added any new classifications to the list since 
adding nonmarital parentage in 1977. Moreover, the Court has refused to 
apply heightened scrutiny to other classifications, including age,49 
 
Dennehy, No. 05-11456-DPW, 2006 U.S. Dist. WL 1581528, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2006) 
(“The underlying equal protection inquiry, . . . is whether different treatment of two separately 
classified groups is at least marginally reasonable.” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
43 For further discussion, see Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. 747 (2011). Yoshino argues that “pluralism anxiety” has caused the Supreme Court to 
systematically deny heightened scrutiny to new groups. Id. at 755. Pluralism anxiety is an 
apprehension about the country’s growing diversity that stems from the increased visibility of 
“‘new’ kinds of people,” including immigrants, and “newly visible people,” including groups 
introduced to the country by social movements, such as the transgender community. Id. at 747. 
Yoshino argues that the Supreme Court has all but closed the possibility of creating a new 
suspect class. Id. at 757. 
44 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (subjecting a state law prohibiting 
marriage between a white person and a person of another race to strict scrutiny).  
45 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 64546 (1948) (subjecting a state land transfer 
statute that discriminated on the basis of national origin to strict scrutiny); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 21516 (1944) (applying the “most rigid scrutiny” to legislation and an 
executive order that excluded individuals of Japanese ancestry from the U.S. West Coast 
during World War II). 
46 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (subjecting a state law that 
conditioned welfare benefits on citizenship to heightened scrutiny). But see Foley v. Connelie, 
435 U.S. 291, 297, 299300 (1978) (applying rational basis review to a New York state law 
requirement that police be citizens because the law pertained to a core governmental function); 
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 8183, 87 (1976) (holding that congressional use of the 
alienage classification requires only rational basis review because the Constitution grants 
Congress authority over alienage issues). 
47 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 53031 (1996) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny to gender-based discrimination in education); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 
(1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based discrimination in a state statute 
regulating the sale of alcohol). 
48 See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 76567, 769 (1977) (applying heightened 
scrutiny to a state statute permitting children born in wedlock, but not children born out of 
wedlock, to inherit from their intestate fathers). 
49 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 31314 (1976) (per curiam) (subjecting 
the state mandatory retirement age of fifty for police officers to rational basis review because 
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disability,50 and sexual orientation.51 With the Court reluctant to expand 
heightened scrutiny to new classifications, arguing for a suspect class based 
on gender nonconformity seems untenable. 
Historically, courts have been unwilling to include discrimination 
against transgender people in the definition of discrimination “based on sex” 
or sex stereotyping,52 although this may be changing in the context of 
employment discrimination. Both the Sixth and the Eleventh Circuits have 
held that discrimination against transgender employees may constitute 
discrimination “because of sex” and sex stereotyping under Title VII and the 
Equal Protection Clause. Accordingly, those circuits have applied an 
intermediate level of scrutiny to the claims of transgender employees.53 
 
it implicated neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class). 
50 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (applying 
rational basis review to a city zoning ordinance that prevented homes for the mentally disabled 
to be built in certain areas). 
51 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
[majority opinion invaliding the Defense of Marriage Act] does not resolve and indeed does 
not even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal 
Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than 
mere rationality.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (avoiding the question of 
whether a classification based on sexual orientation merits heightened scrutiny by finding that 
a Colorado constitutional amendment repealing ordinances prohibiting discrimination based 
on sexual orientation violated equal protection “in the most literal sense”); but see SmithKline 
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (interpreting Windsor as 
applying heightened scrutiny to classifications based on sexual orientation). 
52 See Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 
15, 32 & n.48 (2003) (citing Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 
1984 (“The words of Title VII do not outlaw discrimination against a person who has a sexual 
identity disorder, i.e., . . . a person born with a female body who believes herself to be a 
male . . . .”)); see also Sommers v. Budget Mktg., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding 
that “discrimination based on one’s transsexualism does not fall within the protective purview 
of” Title VII’s protections against discrimination based on sex); Holloway v. Arthur Anderson 
& Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to extend protection of Title VII to transgender 
employees because discrimination against transgender individuals is on the basis of “gender” 
rather than “sex”), overruled by Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(recognizing that the approach in Holloway was overruled by the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)). 
53 Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming the district court’s 
holding that discrimination against a transgender employee constituted discrimination based 
on sex in violation of the Equal Protection Clause where the government failed to supply a 
“sufficiently important governmental interest”); Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 
737 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that transgender plaintiff stated a claim for sex discrimination 
“by alleging discrimination . . . for his failure to conform to sex stereotypes”); Smith v. City 
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Having alleged that his failure to conform to 
sex stereotypes concerning how a man should look and behave was the driving force behind 
Defendants’ actions, Smith has sufficiently pleaded claims of sex stereotyping and gender 
discrimination.”); see also Schroer v. Billington, 557 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) (“In 
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However, courts have shown no sign of extending intermediate scrutiny 
to discrimination against transgender people in the prison context. Courts 
have been consistent in applying rational basis review to the equal protection 
claims of transgender prisoners seeking gender-confirming health care, and 
few have found in favor of the prisoner on equal protection grounds.54 
Whether or not equal protection will prove a viable litigation strategy in the 
future, it is not likely to be a successful strategy at this time. 
II. THE CURRENT STRATEGY: LITIGATING TRANSGENDER PRISONER 
MEDICAL NEEDS UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
In light of the unlikelihood of successful litigation under the Equal 
Protection Clause, transgender prisoner plaintiffs have turned to the Eighth 
Amendment to argue that a deprivation of hormone therapy and sex-
reassignment surgery constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 
A. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK 
The Eighth Amendment proscribes “cruel and unusual punishments.”55 
Cruel and unusual punishment is that which is “incompatible with the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,”56 or that which involves “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
pain.”57 In the context of prison medical care, “unnecessary and wanton 
 
refusing to hire [plaintiff] because her appearance and background did not comport with the 
decisionmaker’s sex stereotypes about how men and women should act and appear, and in 
response to [plaintiff’s] decision to transition, legally, culturally, and physically, from male to 
female, the Library of Congress violated Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination.”).  
54 Some courts have dismissed equal protection claims because they found—with only a 
brief discussion—that the plaintiffs failed to show they were treated differently than similarly 
situated individuals. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sampson, 536 F. App’x 356, 358 (4th Cir. 2013); 
Smith v. Hayman, 489 F. App’x 544, 547 (3d Cir. 2012); Battista v. Dennehy, No. 05-11456-
DPW, 2006 U.S. Dist. WL 1581528, at *6–7 (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2006). At least one court 
avoided addressing the equal protection issue by deciding the case on Eighth Amendment 
grounds. See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Having determined 
that the district court properly held that Act 105 violates the Eighth Amendment, both on its 
face and as applied to plaintiffs, we need not address the district court’s alternate holding that 
the law violates the Equal Protection Clause.”). Others did not address the Equal Protection 
Clause at all because it was not raised in the pleadings. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. 
Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2012) (“Kosilek alleges that his rights under the Eighth 
Amendment are being violated by the DOC’s refusal to provide him with . . . sex reassignment 
surgery . . . .”). 
55 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
56 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 
(1958) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
57 Id. at 103 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
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infliction of pain” is denial of medical care where such denial would serve 
no penological purpose.58 While imprisoned, “[a]n inmate must rely on 
prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, 
those needs will not be met.”59 An Eighth Amendment violation occurs where 
prison officials have shown “deliberate indifference to [the] serious medical 
needs of prisoners.”60 This test has both an objective and subjective prong.61 
Whether a prisoner’s particular medical needs constitute a “serious medical 
need” is an objective inquiry;62 whether the prison officials acted with 
“deliberate indifference” is a subjective inquiry.63 
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance on what constitutes a 
serious medical need.64 The First Circuit defines a serious medical need as 
one “that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one 
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity 
for a doctor’s attention.”65 The Ninth Circuit defines a serious medical need 
as “one that involves a substantial risk of serious harm if not adequately 
treated.”66 
The Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether GID or 
gender dysphoria constitutes a serious medical need protected by the Eighth 
Amendment, and most circuit courts have avoided expressly ruling on the 
issue. Some circuit courts have found that GID can constitute a serious 




60 Id. at 104. 
61 Koselik v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 206 (D. Mass. 2012). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 See Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and Prisoner 
Interests in Determining What is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815, 1817 (2012) 
(“The ‘objective’ prong purports to measure the ‘seriousness’ of the challenged condition, but 
close scrutiny of court decisions reveals that there is no organized methodology to determine 
what makes a condition ‘sufficiently’ serious.”). 
65 Mahan v. Plymouth Cnty. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
66 Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 207 (citing McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th 
Cir. 1992)) (“A serious medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could 
result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
67 In 1988, the Eighth Circuit found that “transsexualism” is a serious medical need for 
which some type of treatment is required, although not necessarily hormone therapy. White v. 
Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988). Seven years later, in Long v. Nix, the Southern 
District of Iowa interpreted the definition of “transsexualism” narrowly, to exclude GID. 877 
F. Supp. 1358, 1365 (S.D. Iowa 1995). In 1986, the Tenth Circuit held that some form of 
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by assuming, without holding, that GID is a serious medical need under the 
Eighth Amendment.68 
As for the subjective prong, a prison official is deliberately indifferent 
if he disregards a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate’s health or 
safety.69 However, the official is only deliberately indifferent if he both knew 
of facts from which he could infer that risk, and he did in fact draw the 
inference.70 
Even if prison officials know that their decisions pose risks to inmates, 
they may not be adjudged deliberately indifferent if they determine that 
safety concerns outweigh the harm to any individual prisoner. The “realities 
of prison administration,”71 including the need for prison officials to “take 
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates,”72 are relevant to 
whether officials acted with deliberate indifference, and the court must 
usually give deference to the prison officials’ “judgment concerning what is 
necessary to discharge their duty to maintain institutional security.”73 In 
Whitley v. Albers, the Supreme Court held that, in deciding whether to use 
force to quell a prison riot, prison officials must weigh the risk of harm to the 
inmate against “competing institutional concerns for the safety of prison staff 
 
therapy was needed after the plaintiff mutilated her genitals so severely that they had to be 
removed by a doctor. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1986). Nine years later, 
the Tenth Circuit interpreted its holding in Supre more broadly to stand for the rule that “prison 
officials must provide treatment to address the medical needs of transsexual prisoners.” Brown 
v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995). As in Supre, the Fourth Circuit in De’Lonta v. 
Angelone found that the plaintiff’s “uncontrollable urge to mutilate her genitals” was a serious 
medical need, without addressing whether GID itself was a serious medical need. 330 F.3d 
630, 632, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). In Praylor v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit initially held that the 
plaintiff was not constitutionally entitled to hormone therapy, even though transsexualism 
does constitute a serious medical need. 423 F.3d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 2005). The court later 
withdrew its opinion and issued a new holding in which it refused to decide whether 
transsexualism constitutes a serious medical need. Praylor v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 
430 F.3d 1208, 1209 (5th Cir. 2005); see Young v. Adams, 693 F. Supp. 2d 635, 640 (W.D. 
Tex. 2010) (explaining the procedural history in Praylor). For further discussion of whether 
GID should be considered a serious medical need, see Laura R. Givens, Note, Why the Courts 
Should Consider Gender Identity Disorder a Per Se Serious Medical Need for Eighth 
Amendment Purposes, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 579, 58793 (2013). 
68 Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (on appeal, the appellant, Wisconsin 
Department of Justice, did not challenge the district court’s holding that GID constitutes a 
serious medical need). 
69 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
70 Id. 
71 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1993). 
72 Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
73 Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 210 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing 
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 32122 (1986)); see Fields, 653 F.3d at 55758. 
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or other inmates.”74 The Court noted that while such a balancing of prisoner 
and institutional concerns is appropriate in the context of a prison riot, it is 
not usually necessary when attending to prisoners’ medical needs. The Court 
observed that “the state’s responsibility to attend to the medical needs of 
prisoners does not ordinarily clash with other equally important 
governmental responsibilities.”75 
Although most medical needs cases do not raise concerns about prison 
security,76 prison officials often rely on institutional security as a justification 
for refusing to provide hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery for 
prisoners diagnosed with GID or gender dysphoria.77 In Fields v. Smith, the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice defended a state law that prohibited prisons 
from providing hormone therapy to inmates on the grounds that “hormone 
therapy alters a person's secondary sex characteristics such as breast size and 
body hair” and “that hormones feminize inmates and make them more 
susceptible to inciting prison violence.”78 
Acknowledging the unique security concern that may be implicated by 
allowing a male-to-female prisoner to present herself as a female in a male 
prison,79 courts have extended the rule in Whitley to these medical needs 
 
74 Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. In Whitley, the prisoner brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 for deprivation of his civil rights after he was shot in the leg by a prison guard during 
the quelling of a prison riot. Id. at 316–17. The Court held that during a prison riot, “prison 
officials undoubtedly must take into account the very real threats the unrest presents to inmates 
and prison officials alike” in deciding whether or not to use force against the inmates. Id. at 
320. Noting that the balancing test should be applied with “due regard for differences in the 
kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is lodged,” the Court 
distinguished prison riots from medical treatment. Id. 
75 Id. (noting that deliberate indifference to a serious medical need could “typically be 
established or disproved without the necessity of balancing competing institutional concerns 
for the safety of prison staff or other inmates”).  
76 See id. 
77 See, e.g., Fields, 653 F.3d at 557 (“Because hormone therapy alters a person’s secondary 
sex characteristics such as breast size and body hair, defendants argue that hormones feminize 
inmates and make them more susceptible to inciting prison violence.”); Battista v. Clarke, 645 
F.3d 449, 451 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Its security evaluation is at the core of the Department’s 
substantive objection to hormone therapy for Battista.”); Koselik II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 19798 
(holding that the prison officials’ stated concern that providing sex-reassignment surgery 
“would create insurmountable security problems” was pretextual); Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 
F. Supp. 2d 228, 240, 247–48 (D. Mass. 2012) (invalidating the Department of Corrections’ 
formal policy which states that “[g]enital sex reassignment surgery is prohibited as it presents 
overwhelming safety and security concerns in a correctional environment”). 
78 Fields, 653 F.3d at 557. 
79 A 2007 study of California men’s prisons found that 59% of transgender women had 
been sexually assaulted while in prison, as compared to 4% of a random sample of the general 
prison population. VALERIE JENNESS ET AL., VIOLENCE IN CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONAL 
FACILITIES: AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 3 (2007), available at http://
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cases. They cite to Whitley for the proposition that a denial of hormone 
therapy or sex-reassignment surgery may not be overly harsh “in light of the 
realities of prison administration”80 and that “[p]rison administrators are 
usually entitled to deference by the courts in their judgment concerning what 
is necessary to discharge their duty to maintain institutional security.”81 
However, “deference does not extend to actions taken in bad faith and for no 
legitimate purpose.”82 Thus, courts analyze the government’s stated security 
concern to determine whether it is pretextual.83 
Although prison security may be a permissible reason for denying 
adequate care for a serious medical need, many federal courts have found that 
the cost of the treatment is never a legitimate reason for denying adequate 
medical care.84 In the context of GID, courts have rejected cost as a legitimate 
 
www.wcl.american.edu/endsilence/documents/ViolenceinCaliforniaCorrectionalFacilities.
pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/A3R4-UD5K. See generally Gabriel Arkles, Safety and 
Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking Segregation of Transgender People in Detention, 
18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 515, 517 (2009) (discussing the causes and nature of 
violence against transgender, intersex, and gender nonconforming people in prisons). 
80 Soneeya, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 243 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319). 
81 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 32122); see Fields, 653 
F.3d at 55758. 
82 Fields, 653 F.3d at 558 (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
83 Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 452 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[D]efendants’ reliance on their 
administrative discretion in invoking and dealing with security concerns has been undercut by 
a collection of pretexts, delays, and misrepresentations . . . .”); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 
210 (“[P]rison officials forfeit their right to deference when their stated, legitimate grounds 
for refusing treatment are proven to be pretextual, and the plaintiff establishes that the 
‘balancing judgments’ were not ‘within the realm of reason and made in good faith.’” (quoting 
Battista, 645 F.3d at 45455)). 
84 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 30102 (1991) (finding no “indication that other [prison] 
officials have sought to use [a cost defense] to avoid the holding of Estelle v. Gamble”); Fields, 
653 F.3d at 556 (“[A]t oral argument . . . [the state] disclaimed any argument that [the statute 
prohibiting hormone therapy or sex reassignment surgery] is justified by cost savings.”); 
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 704 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that plaintiff’s claim that 
doctors “recommended extraction [of tooth] not on the basis of their medical views, but 
because of monetary incentives,” if proven, would contribute to a showing of deliberate 
indifference by the defendants); Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding 
that the fact that evidence that prison doctor avoided providing physical therapy to an inmate 
because it “would have placed a considerable burden and expense on the prison and was 
therefore frowned upon throughout the prison health system” might contribute to a showing 
of deliberate indifference); Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1509 (11th Cir. 1991) (“We do 
not agree that ‘financial considerations must be considered in determining the reasonableness’ 
of inmates’ medical care to the extent that such a rationale could ever be used by so-called 
‘poor states’ to deny a prisoner the minimally adequate care to which he or she is entitled.” 
(quoting district court opinion)); Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We 
find no other explanation in the record than the budget concerns for denying Jones’s surgery. 
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justification for denying hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery.85 
B. CRITICISMS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT MEDICAL MODEL 
The problem with litigating under the Eighth Amendment rather than 
the Equal Protection Clause is that the Eighth Amendment relies more 
heavily on a medical definition of gender nonconformity. Under the Equal 
Protection Clause, the class of people who identify as gender nonconforming 
is not necessarily based on a medical definition. Unlike the Eighth 
Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause has not been interpreted to have a 
specific requirement that each individual plaintiff prove that he or she has a 
serious medical need for which hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery 
is a necessary treatment. Some transgender activists have harshly criticized 
the medical approach as being at odds with the view in the transgender 
community that self-identification, not a medical diagnosis, should be the 
determining factor of a person’s membership in a gender category.86 Most of 
the published criticisms of the medical model are based on the DSM-IV 
definition of GID, rather than the new DSM-5 definition of gender 
dysphoria.87 These include four main criticisms.88  
First, scholars have argued that “the medical model pathologizes and 
thus stigmatizes trans people.”89 A medical diagnosis of GID implies that 
 
Budgetary constraints, however, do not justify cruel and unusual punishment.”); Ancata v. 
Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Lack of funds for facilities 
cannot justify an unconstitutional lack of competent medical care and treatment for inmates.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
85 See, e.g., Fields, 653 F.3d at 556 (“[A]t oral argument . . . [the state] disclaimed any 
argument that [the statute prohibiting hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery] is 
justified by cost savings.”); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 210 (“the cost of adequate medical 
care is not a legitimate reason for not providing such care to a prisoner”); Soneeya, 851 F. 
Supp. 2d at 243 (“Cost of treatment . . . may not be used as a reason to deny an inmate 
medically necessary care.”); Koselik v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 162 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (if “concerns about cost or controversy prompt [the DOC Commissioner] to deny 
Kosilek adequate care for his serious medical need, [the DOC Commissioner] will have 
violated the Eighth Amendment”). 
86 See Judith Butler, Undiagnosing Gender, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 274, 275 (Paisley 
Currah et al. eds., 2006); Spade, supra note 52, at 29. 
87 See supra notes 16–19 and accompanying text. 
88 See Alvin Lee, Trans Models in Prison: The Medicalization of Gender Identity and the 
Eighth Amendment Right to Sex Reassignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447, 457 
(2008) (discussing the criticisms of the Eighth Amendment medical model). 
89 Id. See also Butler, supra note 86, at 275 (“To be diagnosed with gender identity 
disorder is to . . . suffer a certain stigmatization as a consequence of the diagnosis being given 
at all.”); Jerry L. Dasti, Note, Advocating a Broader Understanding of the Necessity of Sex-
Reassignment Surgery Under Medicaid, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1738, 1738 (2002) (calling for a 
“broader conception of medical necessity” that “does not . . . stigmatiz[e] gender variance as 
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transgender individuals “are somehow flawed people”90 and that they are “in 
some way . . . ill, sick, wrong, out of order [or] abnormal.”91 Second, critics 
have argued that the medical model disadvantages low-income transgender 
people who cannot afford the level of health care needed to diagnose and treat 
GID.92 
The third criticism of the medical model based on a diagnosis of GID is 
that it is underinclusive.93 Critics have argued that gender nonconforming 
people who do not fit neatly into the DSM-IV definition would be foreclosed 
from a diagnosis of GID.94 Furthermore, in most jurisdictions, even a 
diagnosis of GID alone is insufficient to prove that a prisoner suffers from a 
serious medical need under the Eighth Amendment; most courts additionally 
require the prisoner to prove that the denial of treatment will result in serious 
physical or mental harm. Courts often look for extreme evidence of harm 
such as attempted suicide or self-castration,95 overlooking prisoners suffering 
from other real, but less extreme, harms. Finally, critics of the medical model 
based on GID have argued that it reinforces a coercive gender binary.96 The 
diagnostic criteria for GID are based on the idea of “two discrete gender 
categories that normally contain everyone but occasionally are wrongly 
assigned.”97 This narrow conception of gender excludes some transgender 
and genderless individuals who do not fit into one of the stereotypical gender 
categories. Thus, relying on a diagnosis of GID leaves behind those 
individuals who do not “inhabit and perform the new gender category 
successfully.”98 
In drafting the DSM-5, the editors responded to these criticisms by 
replacing GID with a new category called “gender dysphoria.”99 The editors 
sought to create a whole new conception of the condition that would 
minimize the stigma of a medical diagnosis without eliminating the condition 
 
a ‘disease’ that must be ‘cured’”). 
90 Spade, supra note 52, at 34. 
91 Butler, supra note 86, at 275. 
92 Lee, supra note 88, at 458; Spade, supra note 52, at 35. 
93 Lee, supra note 88, at 45859. 
94 Id. at 459; Romeo, supra note 7, at 731 (“Because the experiences of many gender 
nonconforming people do not match the diagnostic criteria of GID, and because, for all except 
the most privileged few, accessing trans-friendly health care is extraordinarily difficult, the 
medical model of gender does not serve the vast majority of gender non-conforming people.”). 
95 See De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 632 (4th Cir. 2003); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 
F.2d 958, 960, 963 (10th Cir. 1986). 
96 Lee, supra note 88, at 459; see Spade, supra note 52, at 35. 
97 Spade, supra note 52, at 26. 
98 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
99 Moran, supra note 17. 
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completely.100 They were concerned with maintaining access to a medical 
diagnosis for those people who rely on the diagnosis to obtain medical 
care.101 This is especially important for prisoners seeking gender-confirming 
medical treatment under the Eighth Amendment, who have to prove that they 
have a serious medical need. Instead of eliminating the condition, the editors 
removed it from the chapter on sexual dysfunctions, placing it in its own 
chapter called gender dysphoria. In addition to removing the word “disorder” 
from the title, the editors changed the diagnostic criteria to reflect an 
emphasis on gender incongruence rather than cross-gender identification.102 
This new conceptualization moves away from the gender binary, making the 
condition more inclusive for those people who do not fit neatly into one 
gender category.  
Although the new diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 addressed many of 
the criticisms of the medical model, it could not change the fact that requiring 
a medical diagnosis in the first place disadvantages low income transgender 
people who do not have access to health care. This is especially a problem in 
the prison context, because some state departments of correction apply a 
“freeze frame” policy to hormone therapy, which conditions access to 
hormone therapy on whether or not the prisoner was receiving treatment 
before entering the prison system.103 Treatment is “frozen” at the level of 
hormones the prisoner was receiving at the time he or she entered the prison 
system.104 However, prisons may be moving away from this “freeze frame” 
model. In 2011, the Federal Bureau of Prisons agreed to end its “freeze 
frame” policy for hormone therapy as part of the settlement in a lawsuit 





103 See, e.g., ALA. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMIN. REGULATION 637(V)(E)(2) (2005), available 
at http:// www.doc.state.al.us/docs/AdminRegs/AR637.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9AQ
6-87U4.  
104 See Press Release, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Federal Bureau of Prisons 
Makes Major Change in Transgender Medical Policy (Sept. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/press-releases/2011-09-29-adams-victory.pdf (describing 
the federal “freeze frame” policy prior to 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/3XG8-GDWT. 
105 Stipulation for Compromise Settlement and Release Ex. A, Adams v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, No. 09-10272-JLT (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.clearing
house.net/detail.php?id=14130&search=source%7Cgeneral%3BdocketSimpleYear%7C2009
%3BdocketSimpleText%7C10272%3BtrialCourt%7C38%3Borderby%7CfilingYear%3B, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AEQ4-CURV; see Case Summary & History: Adams v. Federal 
Bureau of Prisons et al., NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, http://www.nclrights.org/cases-
and-policy/cases-and-advocacy/adams-v-federal-bureau-of-prisons-et-al/ (last visited Jan. 23, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/G86G-UZFF; see also Adams v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 
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The medical model of the Eighth Amendment will always be somewhat 
in conflict with a conception of gender identity based only on self-
identification. However, where the treatment sought is of a medical nature, 
like hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery, prisons are realistically 
always going to require a medical diagnosis.  
III. FINDING DISCRIMINATION WITHIN THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Neither the Eighth Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause is a 
perfect litigation strategy for challenging discriminatory prison policies 
banning hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery. Although litigants 
have had considerably more success obtaining access to gender-confirming 
health care under the Eighth Amendment than the Equal Protection Clause, 
the Eighth Amendment has not traditionally been used as a tool for fighting 
discrimination. However, two recent federal court opinions suggest that 
discrimination may in fact be relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis. 
In Fields v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit struck down a state law banning 
hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery for all prisoners in the 
state.106 In Kosilek v. Spencer, the District of Massachusetts granted an 
injunction requiring prison officials to provide the plaintiff with sex-
reassignment surgery.107 Both courts relied on the Eighth Amendment, 
holding that prison officials had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ 
serious medical needs. Although neither court’s holding relied on the Equal 
Protection Clause, their Eighth Amendment analyses were laced with 
concerns about discrimination against and the equal protection of transgender 
prisoners. Subparts III(A) and III(B) look closely at the courts’ reasoning in 
these two opinions for signs of equal protection influence, and subpart III(C) 
discusses these two cases in the broader context of transgender prisoner 
health care litigation.  
A. HIDDEN EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS: FIELDS V. SMITH 
In Fields v. Smith, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision to strike down a Wisconsin state law (Act 105) prohibiting the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections (WDOC) from providing transgender 
inmates with hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery.108 The district 
 
716 F. Supp. 2d 107 (D. Mass. 2010) (order denying the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ motion to 
dismiss the complaint). 
106 Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011). 
107 Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d, 774 
F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). For a discussion of the subsequent history of this case, see infra text 
accompanying notes 132–140, 171–175.  
108 Fields, 653 F.3d at 559. 
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court held that the blanket prohibition on access to certain types of treatment 
for GID violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.109 The district court denied class certification “on behalf of all 
current and future [W]DOC inmates with ‘strong, persistent cross-gender 
identification,’” but allowed three individual plaintiffs to proceed.110 The 
plaintiffsAndrea Fields, Matthew Davison (also known as Jessica 
Davison), and Vankemah Moatonwere male-to-female transgender 
prisoners.111 Before Act 105 was passed, WDOC physicians had diagnosed 
each of them with GID and prescribed hormone therapy.112 
The district court held that Act 105 violated the Eighth Amendment 
facially113 and as applied to these three plaintiffs.114 The court found that GID 
is a serious medical need and that by enforcing the blanket ban on hormone 
therapy and sex-reassignment surgery, prison officials were deliberately 
indifferent to that need.115 
The district court also held that Act 105 violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that no fundamental 
right or suspect classification was at issue, so the rational basis standard of 
review was appropriate.116 To prevail under rational basis review, a plaintiff 
must prove: (1) the defendant intentionally treated him differently from 
similarly situated individuals; (2) the differential treatment was because of 
his membership in a class; and (3) the differential treatment was not rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental interest.117 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that 
Act 105 violates the Eighth Amendment, “both on its face and as applied to 
plaintiffs,” and thus found it unnecessary to “address the district court’s 
alternate holding that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause.”118 
Although the Seventh Circuit expressly said that it would not address the 
 




113 Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 866 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (“[T]he controlling class 
for a facial challenge to a statute is ‘the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group 
for whom the law is irrelevant.’” (internal citation omitted)). 
114 Id. at 863. The court held that as applied to the plaintiffs in Fields, enforcement of Act 
105 prevents WDOC doctors from providing treatment that they have deemed necessary to 
treat the plaintiffs’ serious medical conditions. Id. 
115 Id. at 862, 866. 
116 Id. at 867.  
117 Id. (citing Smith v. City of Chicago, 457 F.3d 643, 65051 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
118 Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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equal protection claim, it affirmed the district court’s reasoning under each 
step of the rational basis test, essentially engaging in a covert equal protection 
analysis. 
First, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis appeared to adopt the district court’s 
analysis under the first step of the rational basis test. The Seventh Circuit 
echoed the district court’s equal protection language by making two clear 
references to similarly situated individuals. In the first reference, the court 
relied on the same medical testimony as the district court in finding that “no 
other state law or policy, besides Act 105, . . . prohibits prison doctors from 
providing inmates with medically necessary treatment.”119 
In the second reference, the Seventh Circuit referred to similarly situated 
prisoners in its discussion of the costs of hormone therapy and sex-
reassignment surgery. The court analyzed the costs of these treatments to 
undermine the empirical assumption that such treatments are expensive.120 
The defendants conceded in oral argument that cost savings do not justify 
Act 105.121 The court relied on the record to show that the costs of hormone 
therapy and sex-reassignment surgery are no more than the costs of medical 
treatments for other prisoners: 
In 2004, DOC paid a total of $2,300 for hormones for two inmates. That same year, 
DOC paid $2.5 million to provide inmates with quetiapine, an antipsychotic drug which 
costs more than $2,500 per inmate per year. Sex reassignment surgery is significantly 
more expensive, costing approximately $20,000. However, other significant surgeries 
may be more expensive. In 2005, DOC paid $37,244 for one coronary bypass surgery 
and $32,897 for one kidney transplant surgery.122 
Second, the Seventh Circuit appeared to affirm the district court’s 
finding under the second step of the rational basis test that those in the class 
of “persons who need hormonal therapy to treat GID”123 were singled out for 
different treatment because of their membership in that class. The Seventh 
 
119 Id. at 554. In finding that Act 105 “intentionally treated [the plaintiffs] differently from 
others similarly situated,” Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 867 (internal citation omitted), the district 
court reasoned that “GID is the only medically necessary condition for which mental health 
treatments are barred by law or regulation within the DOC.” Id. It also noted that “there is no 
evidence of any other Wisconsin laws banning medical treatment for inmates or any DOC 
policies that ban necessary medical treatment for inmates.” Id. 
120 Fourteen years earlier, in Maggert v. Hanks, the Seventh Circuit upheld summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants in a similar deliberate indifference case, relying on the 
empirical assumption that hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery are “protracted and 
expensive” and not necessarily available to those who are not affluent. Maggert v. Hanks, 131 
F.3d 670, 67172 (7th Cir. 1997). The court in Fields analyzed the costs to undermine this 
dicta from Maggert. Fields, 653 F.3d at 555–56. 
121 Fields, 653 F.3d at 556. 
122 Id. at 555. 
123 Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 867. 
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Circuit stated that “[s]urely, had the Wisconsin legislature passed a law that 
DOC inmates with cancer must be treated only with therapy and pain killers, 
this court would have no trouble concluding that the law was 
unconstitutional.”124 By replacing the more controversial medical need, GID, 
with one that most people accept as a serious medical need, cancer, the court 
implied that this group of prisoners was singled out because of the nature of 
its members’ medical needs. 
Finally, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s reasoning under 
the third step of the rational basis review test, in which the district court held 
that Act 105 was not rationally related to prison officials’ stated security 
concerns.125 Although the district court analyzed prison security under the 
Equal Protection Clause,126 not the Eighth Amendment, the Seventh Circuit 
simply adopted the district court’s security findings into its Eighth 
Amendment analysis. The Seventh Circuit held that “[t]he district court did 
not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendants’ evidence failed to 
establish any security benefits associated with a ban on hormone therapy.”127 
Although the Seventh Circuit explicitly said it would not evaluate 
Act 105 under the Equal Protection Clause, it did just that. The court affirmed 
the reasoning of the district court on each of the three steps of the rational 
basis review test. 
B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND POLITICAL CONTROVERSY: 
KOSILEK V. SPENCER 
In Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), the United States District Court for 
the District of Massachusetts granted an injunction in favor of the plaintiff 
Michelle Kosilek, a male-to-female transgender prisoner, requiring the 
Massachusetts Department of Corrections (MDOC) to provide her with sex-
reassignment surgery.128 The court’s order was the first in United States 
 
124 Fields, 653 F.3d at 556. 
125 Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 868. 
126 The district court found that “[p]rison safety and security are legitimate penological 
interests,” but that Act 105 is not rationally related to “the DOC’s interests in protecting 
effeminate-appearing inmates from harm and maintaining the safety and security of other 
inmates, staff, and the institution.” Fields, 712 F. Supp. 2d at 867–68. The district court 
focused on testimony from the state’s security expert, who conceded that it would be an 
“incredible stretch” to say that prohibiting hormone therapy would prevent sexual assaults in 
prison. Id. at 868. The district court found no evidence that banning hormone therapy would 
decrease the risk that plaintiffs would become targets of sexual assault, and thus, the Act is 
not rationally related to the government’s stated interest in maintaining prison security. Id. 
127 Fields, 653 F.3d at 558. 
128 Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197, 251 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d, 
774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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history to require a department of corrections to provide sex-reassignment 
surgery for a prisoner.129 The district court held that the MDOC 
Commissioner’s decision to deny Kosilek the surgery violated her Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.130 
Specifically, the district court found that Kosilek had a serious medical need, 
GID, for which sex-reassignment surgery was the only adequate treatment, 
and that the MDOC Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to that need 
in refusing to provide the surgery.131 
In January 2014, a three-judge panel of the First Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s order.132 The panel held that the district court did not clearly 
err in finding that the MDOC’s failure to provide surgery to Kosilek 
constituted inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment.133 The 
panel also held that the district court did not err in finding that the MDOC 
had no valid penological reason for denying the surgery.134 However, one 
month later, the First Circuit withdrew this opinion and granted a rehearing 
en banc.135 On December 16, 2014, three of the five judges on the en banc 
panel voted to reverse the district court’s order.136 The two judges in the 
majority of the three-judge panel dissented from the en banc majority 
opinion.137 The en banc majority examined de novo whether the treatment the 
MDOC offered Kosilek was constitutionally adequate, and determined that it 
was.138 
Although the district court’s opinion has no precedential authority, its 
reasoning may still be instructive for future transgender litigants. The court’s 
analysis shows signs that it was influenced by concerns about prejudice 
against transgender people. Importantly, the First Circuit agreed with the 
district court that political pressure and prejudice are not valid penological 
reasons for denying necessary medical treatment.139 Rather, the First Circuit 
 
129 Associated Press, Trans Inmate Asks US Supreme Court to Allow Sex-Reassignment 
Surgery, GUARDIAN (Mar. 16, 2015, 17:18 EDT), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2015/mar/16/prison-inmate-supreme-court-ruling-sex-resassignment-surgery, archived at 
http://perma.cc/5N6S-HTLR. 
130 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 247. 
131 Id. 
132 Kosilek v. Spencer, 740 F.3d 733, 736 (1st Cir. 2014), withdrawn Feb. 12, 2014. 
133 Id. at 772–73. 
134 Id. 
135 Kosilek v. Spencer, No. 12-2194, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 2660, at *3 (1st Cir. Feb. 12, 
2014). 
136 Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 68 (1st Cir. 2014). 
137 Id. at 96 (Thompson, J., dissenting); id. at 113 (Kayatta, J., dissenting). 
138 Id. at 86, 89. 
139 Id. at 94–96. 
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held that the district court should have given more deference to the MDOC’s 
medical and security experts in assessing whether the MDOC’s motives were 
improper.140 A careful reading of the district court’s analysis may still be 
useful to future transgender litigants in determining under what set of facts a 
judge may be convinced of prison officials’ deliberate indifference. 
The district court’s decision in Kosilek II was predicated on its decision 
in Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I) ten years earlier.141 In that case, Kosilek 
sought an injunction to require the MDOC to provide her with hormone 
therapy.142 The court denied the injunction.143 Although it found that she had 
a serious medical need, GID, for which she had not been adequately treated, 
the court held that the MDOC Commissioner had not been deliberately 
indifferent to her needs because he did not have actual knowledge of her 
suffering.144 Going forward, the court said that security concerns might 
justify denial of hormone therapy if there was no possible way to reconcile 
the Commissioner’s duty to protect inmates’ safety with his duty to provide 
adequate medical care.145 The court ruled that if the Commissioner were to 
decide in the future that safety concerns outweigh Kosilek’s medical need, 
then a court would have to determine whether the Eighth Amendment was 
violated.146 The court warned, however, that if the MDOC Commissioner 
were to base his decision on concerns about cost or political controversy, he 
would violate the Eighth Amendment.147 
In light of its decision in Kosilek I, the district court in Kosilek II 
analyzed the MDOC’s stated security justification for denying Kosilek sex-
reassignment surgery. The court found that Kosilek had a serious medical 
need for which the only adequate treatment was sex-reassignment surgery.148 
The court determined that, unlike in Kosilek I, the current MDOC 
Commissioner was deliberately indifferent to Kosilek’s serious medical need 
because she had actual knowledge of Kosilek’s suffering and her stated 
 
140 Id. at 86–89 (disagreeing with the district court’s finding that the MDOC’s medical 
expert was imprudent because of his belief that sex-reassignment surgery was not medically 
necessary); id. at 91–92 (holding that the MDOC’s reliance on medical experts was reasonable 
and negates a finding of deliberate indifference); id. at 93–94 (holding that the district court 
should have given more deference to the MDOC’s security experts). 
141 Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002). 
142 Id. at 159. 
143 Id. at 195. 
144 Id. at 161–62. 
145 Id. at 162. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Kosilek v. Spencer (Kosilek II), 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 22930 (D. Mass. 2012). 
5. HALBACH (FINAL TO PRINTER) 7/20/2016  
488 HALBACH [Vol. 105 
security concern was pretextual.149 The court found that the real motive for 
prohibiting the surgery was the Commissioner’s concerns about public and 
political criticisma rationale which the court in Kosilek I said violates the 
Eighth Amendment.150 
Although Kosilek did not raise an equal protection claim in her 
complaint,151 and the district court did not mention the Fourteenth 
Amendment in its opinion, the district court’s Eighth Amendment analysis 
was seemingly influenced by two equal protection principles. First, the court 
invoked the equal protection principle of similarly situated individuals, 
stressing that Kosilek was treated differently from similarly situated 
prisoners with more familiar medical needs because of the unpopular nature 
of her medical need. Second, in analyzing whether the prison officials’ stated 
security justification was made in bad faith, the court applied a similar pretext 
analysis to that applied in equal protection cases in which the courts use 
“rational basis with bite” review.152 The court in Kosilek II did not 
clandestinely engage in equal protection analysis as the Seventh Circuit did 
in Fields,153 but it introduced concepts that are not usually part of Eighth 
Amendment analysis. 
The first influence of equal protection in the court’s analysis is its 
references to similarly situated prisoners, a principle not typically present in 
Eighth Amendment analysis. For example, the district court cited to a portion 
of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Fields that compared prisoners seeking 
hormone therapy to prisoners in need of cancer treatment: “[s]urely, had the 
[] legislature passed a law that DOC inmates with cancer must be treated only 
with therapy and pain killers, this court would have no trouble concluding 
that the law was unconstitutional.”154 By including this quotation, the court 
demonstrated that Kosilek was treated differently than similarly situated 
prisoners with a more familiar medical need, and that the differential 
treatment was because of the unconventional nature of that need. 
The court also suggested that the treatment of Kosilek was cruel and 
unusual because it was discriminatory, stating that “[i]t is unusual to treat a 
prisoner suffering severely from a gender identity disorder differently than 
the numerous inmates suffering from more familiar forms of mental 
 
149 Id. at 23740. 
150 Id. at 240. 
151 Second Amended Complaint at 13–14, Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. 
Mass. 2012) (No. 00-12455-MLW). 
152 See supra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
153 See supra Part III.A. 
154 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 208 (quoting Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 556 (7th Cir. 
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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illness.”155 This quote suggests that the court, in determining that the prison 
officials acted with deliberate indifference, was persuaded, at least in part, by 
the fact that the officials were discriminating against her because of Kosilek’s 
GID. 
Finally, the court compared Kosilek to non-transgender similarly 
situated prisoners, stating that “Kosilek shares with every other inmate in the 
DOC’s custody the right to have decisions concerning [her]156 made by prison 
officials reasonably and in good faith in order to assure that [she] is not again 
subject to the cruel and unusual punishment that the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits.”157 This statement suggests that prison officials did not simply 
violate Kosilek’s right to be free from cruel and unusual treatment; by 
violating her Eighth Amendment right because of her transgender status, they 
may have also violated her right to equal protection, as well. 
The second apparent influence of equal protection principles on the 
district court’s decision in Kosilek II appears in its analysis of whether the 
MDOC had a legitimate penological reason to deny Kosilek’s treatment. 
Without explicitly invoking “rational basis with bite,”158 the district court 
used similar language in drawing the line for legitimate penological interests 
under the Eighth Amendment. The “rational basis with bite” test comes from 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, in which the Supreme 
Court held “that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”159 The district court’s 
analysis in Kosilek II mirrors the language in the “rational basis with bite” 
test. In Kosilek II, the court held that concerns about political or public 
criticism surrounding Kosilek’s status as both a convicted murderer and a 
transgender woman cannot constitute a legitimate penological interest under 
the Eighth Amendment.160 
Commissioner Dennehy claimed that Kosilek’s request for surgery was 
denied because of the risk it posed to prison security.161 Although the court 
held that prison security is a valid penological interest, it concluded that 
 
155 Id. at 205. 
156 The district court used a male pronoun to refer to Kosilek. Id. at 198. 
157 Id. at 205. 
158 See supra notes 38–41 and accompanying text (discussing “rational basis with bite”). 
159 U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (emphasis omitted). 
160 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201 (“[S]ecurity is a legitimate consideration for Eighth 
Amendment purposes. A concern about political or public criticism for discharging a 
constitutional duty is not.” (quoting Kosilek v. Maloney (Kosilek I), 221 F. Supp. 156, 162 (D. 
Mass. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
161 Id. at 240. 
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Dennehy’s security concerns were pretextual162 and that her decision was 
instead based on a desire to avoid public and political criticism, which is not 
a permissible penological interest.163 The court first grounded its reasoning 
in the Eighth Amendment: 
Denying adequate medical care because of a fear of controversy or criticism from 
politicians, the press, and the public serves no legitimate penological purpose. It is 
precisely the type of conduct the Eighth Amendment prohibits . . . . “[T]he very purpose 
of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political 
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.”164 Therefore, “[t]he right to be 
free of cruel and unusual punishments, like other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, may 
not be submitted to vote; it depends on the outcome of no elections.”165 
The court then went on to imply that the only reason Kosilek’s request 
for surgery invited public criticism was that she was a convicted murderer: 
Prisoners who have lost their liberty by murdering others may understandably be 
unsympathetic candidates for the humane treatment that they denied their victims. 
However, as future Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in 1979: “[T]he 
whole point of the [Eighth] [A]mendment is to protect persons convicted of crimes. 
Eighth [A]mendment protections are not forfeited by one’s prior acts.” It is despised 
criminals, like Kosilek, who are most likely to need the protection of the Eighth 
Amendment and its enforcement by the courts. 166 
The court also cited a Boston Globe article that refers to Kosilek as a 
“certified wife killer,”167 and another that states, “[t]he [Kosilek] trial 
 
162 Id. at 23940. The court made detailed findings of fact supporting this conclusion. The 
court found that Commissioner Dennehy “was determined not to be the first prison official to 
provide an inmate [with] sex reassignment surgery.” Id. at 201. Dennehy fired the prison 
doctor who had prescribed surgery and hired a doctor who she knew was opposed to 
prescribing the surgery to prisoners under any circumstance. Id. at 20102. The court found 
that Dennehy departed from the department’s established, written procedure for determining 
security risks, and she testified falsely about the risk. Id. at 24041. The court detailed the 
specific pressure that Dennehy faced in the Kosilek case from both politicians and the media. 
Dennehy served under a lieutenant governor who openly opposed spending tax revenues on 
Kosilek’s surgery. Id. at 203. Many members of the state legislature, including one 
representative who had a close relationship with Dennehy, opposed the same. Id. She 
coordinated a television appearance with that legislator to voice her opposition to the surgery. 
Id. at 223. The court also cited several Boston Globe articles, of which Dennehy was aware, 
ridiculing the idea that the state should spend money on a prisoner’s sex-reassignment surgery. 
Id. at 225. The court concluded from this evidence that Dennehy’s actual reason for denying 
Kosilek access to the surgery was because of fear of criticism and controversy. Id. at 198. 
163 Id. at 247. 
164 Id. at 203 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943)). 
165 Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
166 Id. at 20304 (quoting Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 194 (9th Cir. 1979)). 
167 Id. at 214 (citing Brian McGrory, A Test Case for Change, BOSTON GLOBE, June 13, 
2000, at B1). 
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underway in federal court in Boston is not about the rights of transsexuals. 
It’s about the manipulations of a murderer.”168 
If the court had stopped there, it might be said that the court was 
concerned only with the political and public criticism surrounding Kosilek 
based on her status as a “despised criminal” and “certified wife killer.” 
However, a few paragraphs after the last excerpt, the court confirmed that it 
was concerned not only with discrimination based on her status as a 
murderer, but also on her status as a transgender woman. The court stated: 
It has long been well-established that it is cruel for prison officials to permit an inmate 
to suffer unnecessarily from a serious medical need. It is unusual to treat a prisoner 
suffering severely from a gender identity disorder differently than the numerous inmates 
suffering from more familiar forms of mental illness. It is not permissible for prison 
officials to do so just because the fact that a gender identity disorder is a major mental 
illness is not understood by much of the public and the required treatment for it is 
unpopular.169 
Moreover, the court concluded that “the defendant has denied Kosilek 
sex reassignment surgery because of the belief that the idea of providing such 
treatment for a transsexual who murdered his wife is offensive to many 
members of the community, many of their elected representatives, and to the 
actively interested media as well.”170 Therefore, Kosilek’s right to equal 
protection of her Eighth Amendment right seems to be driving the court’s 
holding. 
The district court did not expressly rule on whether the MDOC’s 
decision to deny Kosilek’s request for sex-reassignment surgery violated the 
Equal Protection Clause, and it is not obvious from the opinion that the court 
would have found a violation. It is clear, however, that the court’s reasoning 
under the Eighth Amendment was influenced by its concerns about 
discrimination against transgender prisoners, as evidenced by its references 
to similarly situated prisoners and its concerns about political and public 
criticism based on Kosilek’s status as a transgender woman. 
On appeal, the en banc majority of the First Circuit agreed with the 
district court that “public and political criticism” could be grounds for a 
finding of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment where the 
plaintiff is also able to show that the prison officials’ security concerns were 
completely pretextual.171 The First Circuit disagreed, however, with the 
district court’s findings that the MDOC was motivated only by public and 
 
168 Id. at 225 (citing Eileen McNamara, When Gender Isn’t Relevant, BOSTON GLOBE, June 
11, 2006, at B1). 
169 Id. at 205. 
170 Id. at 247. 
171 See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 94–96 (1st Cir. 2014). 
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political criticism and that the MDOC’s safety and security concerns were 
pretextual.172 The First Circuit held that the district court should have given 
more deference to the prison officials on safety and security.173 Moreover, 
the First Circuit held that even if Commissioner Dennehy were motivated by 
public and political criticism, her motivations were not enough to show that 
the MDOC continued to be motivated by public and political criticism after 
she left the position.174  
Unlike the district court’s opinion, the First Circuit’s opinion shows no 
apparent signs of equal protection influence or concerns about prejudice 
against transgender people. However, in her dissent, Judge Thompson 
directly addresses the issue of unfair prejudice against transgender people 
that the district court only hinted about. Comparing the majority’s opinion to 
two of the most notorious equal protection cases in United States history, 
Judge Thompson speculates that the majority’s decision will not stand the 
test of time:  
I am confident that I would not need to pen this dissent, over twenty years after 
Kosilek’s quest for constitutionally adequate medical care began, were she not seeking 
a treatment that many see as strange or immoral. Prejudice and fear of the unfamiliar 
have undoubtedly played a role in this matter’s protraction. Whether today’s decision 
brings this case to a close, I cannot say. But I am confident that this decision will not 
stand the test of time, ultimately being shelved with the likes of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 
U.S. 537 (1896), deeming constitutional state laws requiring racial segregation, and 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), finding constitutional the internment 
of Japanese–Americans in camps during World War II. I only hope that day is not far 
in the future, for the precedent the majority creates is damaging. It paves the way for 
unprincipled grants of en banc relief, decimates the deference paid to a trial judge 
following a bench trial, aggrieves an already marginalized community, and enables 
correctional systems to further postpone their adjustment to the crumbling gender 
binary. 175 
 The First Circuit’s opinion leaves open the question of what set of facts 
would be sufficient to establish deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s need 
for sex-reassignment surgery. The district court’s opinion in Kosilek II and 
Judge Thompson’s dissent to the First Circuit opinion suggest that some 
federal judges will be receptive to an argument framed in terms of 
discrimination and equal protection principles.  
 
172 Id. at 92–96.  
173 Id. at 93–94. 
174 Id. at 95–96. 
175 Id. at 113 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
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C. FIELDS AND KOSILEK II COMPARED AND IN THE BROADER 
CONTEXT 
As in the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Fields, the district court’s Eighth 
Amendment analysis in Kosilek II shows the influence of equal protection 
principles, albeit more subtly. In Fields, the Seventh Circuit essentially 
affirmed the district court’s reasoning for finding an equal protection 
violation, without expressly addressing the claim. In Kosilek II, the court did 
not reason through all of the elements of an equal protection claim, but rather 
applied equal protection concepts like similarly situated individuals, pretext, 
and animus to the Eighth Amendment analysis.176 
There are two obvious differences between Fields and the district 
court’s opinion in Kosilek II that account for the varying levels of equal 
protection influence. First, in Fields, the district court had previously held 
that the Wisconsin law violated the Eighth Amendment and the Equal 
Protection Clause.177 The Seventh Circuit, in affirming the district court’s 
Eighth Amendment holding, also affirmed much of the reasoning that 
supported the equal protection holding below. Unlike Fields, there was no 
earlier decision based on equal protection grounds in Kosilek II. The plaintiff 
in that case did not even raise an equal protection argument in the 
pleadings.178 
The second difference is that Fields dealt with a state law banning 
hormone therapy and sex-reassignment surgery for all prisoners. Such a 
broad state-wide law is more susceptible to an equal protection challenge 
because it openly classifies a group of people for different treatment. In 
Kosilek II, the decision to deny the surgery to Kosilek was individualized. 
One may, however, infer that the district court thought this individualized 
decision was part of a broader unwritten policy from the court’s finding that 
Commissioner Dennehy was “determined not to be the first prison official to 
provide an inmate sex reassignment surgery.”179 Furthermore, the court was 
surely aware of two other recent lawsuits against the MDOC in the 
 
176 Prison health care is not the only area of transgender rights doctrine with examples of 
clandestine equal protection analysis. Professor Gabriel Arkles noted in his article on the 
segregation of transgender prisoners in solitary confinement that the district court in the 
unreported case Tates v. Blanas, “[w]ithout explicitly naming it as such, [] engaged in an Equal 
Protection analysis comparing the treatment of transgender detainees with the treatment of 
similarly situated non-transgender detainees.” Arkles, supra note 79, at 554 (citing Tates v. 
Blanas, No. S-00-2539 OMP, 2003 WL 23864868, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2003)). 
177 Fields v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 862–63, 869 (E.D. Wis. 2010). 
178 Second Amended Complaint at 13–14, Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190 (D. 
Mass. 2012) (No. 00-12455-MLW). 
179 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 201. 
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Massachusetts district court filed by transgender prisoners who were denied 
access to hormone therapy180 and sex-reassignment surgery.181 
Fields and Kosilek II are not the only cases addressing the issue of 
whether prisoners are entitled to hormone therapy and sex-reassignment 
surgery. At least four other courts have recently granted injunctions or 
motions to compel in favor of the prisoners, requiring prison officials to 
administer hormones or allow the prisoner to be evaluated for sex-
reassignment surgery.182 Many more have allowed prisoners to proceed on 
their Eighth Amendment claims by denying the prison officials’ dispositive 
motions.183 
 
180 Battista v. Dennehy, No. 05-11456-DPW, 2006 WL 1581528 (D. Mass. Mar. 22, 2006) 
(seeking hormone therapy), aff’d, Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011). 
181 Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252 (D. Mass. 2012) (seeking screening for 
sex-reassignment surgery). 
182 See Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming district court’s 
decision to grant an injunction requiring prison officials to administer hormone therapy 
because the district court reasonably concluded that prison officials were deliberately 
indifferent); De’lonta v. Clarke, No. 7:11-cv-00257, 2013 WL 4584684 (W.D. Va. Aug. 28, 
2013) (granting plaintiff’s motion to compel prison officials to make her available to be 
evaluated for readiness for sex-reassignment surgery by her own expert, at her own expense); 
Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 252–53 (D. Mass. 2012) (holding that prison 
officials were deliberately indifferent, that the blanket ban on sex-reassignment surgery 
violates the Eighth Amendment, and ordering officials to provide medical evaluations and 
treatment based on an individualized assessment of plaintiff’s needs, including readiness for 
sex-reassignment surgery); Brugliera v. Comm’r of Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 07-40323-JLT, 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131002 at 36 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2009) (granting plaintiff’s Second 
Renewed Motion for Preliminary Injunction requiring prison officials to provide plaintiff with 
hormone therapy).  
183 See, e.g., De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
plaintiff has pled facts sufficient to state a claim under Eighth Amendment where prison 
officials have continued to deny consideration of sex-reassignment surgery); De’lonta v. 
Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 63132 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that plaintiff has pled facts sufficient 
to state a claim under Eighth Amendment where prison officials abruptly cut off hormone 
therapy); Allard v. Gomez, 9 Fed. App’x 793, 795 (9th Cir. 2001) (reversing district court’s 
grant of summary judgment for defendant because triable issues of fact exist as to whether 
hormone therapy was denied on the basis of an individualized medical evaluation or on the 
basis of blanket rule, which would constitute deliberate indifference); Franklin v. Hardy, No. 
12 C 2970, 2013 WL 3147365 at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2013) (holding that plaintiff has 
stated a plausible claim under the Eighth Amendment for failure to treat her GID); Konitzer 
v. Wall, No. 12-cv-874-bbc, 2013 WL 2297059 at *1 (W.D. Wis. May 24, 2013) (same); 
Alexander v. Weiner, 841 F. Supp. 2d 486, 492 (D. Mass. 2012) (same); Adams v. Fed. Bur. 
of Prisons, 716 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112–13 (D. Mass. 2010) (denying defendants’ motion to 
dismiss because even though prison officials have ceased denial of treatment, they have not 
proven that such denial is unlikely to recur); Barrett v. Coplan, 292 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286 
(D.N.H. 2003) (holding plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show prison officials were 
deliberately indifferent to her serious medical need because they refused to evaluate her for 
GID); Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 312 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that defendants 
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Although the district court’s opinion in Kosilek II was eventually 
reversed and Fields alone does not establish a pattern of equal protection 
influence, they are still important opinions because they show how federal 
judges are thinking about the issue of transgender prisoner health care. Fields 
and Kosilek II are among only a few cases that have gone to trial, in which 
the district courts made lengthy findings of fact on the true motivations 
behind the prison officials’ decisions.184 Although the First Circuit ultimately 
held that more facts were needed to support the district court’s finding of 
deliberate indifference in Kosilek II, reading the district court’s opinion in 
conjunction with the First Circuit’s opinion is instructive for future 
transgender litigants seeking to build a case of deliberate indifference. 
Moreover, Fields and Kosilek II are two of the most written-about cases in 
legal literature discussing what level of health care is constitutionally 
required for transgender prisoners.185  
 
have failed to show they were not deliberately indifferent as a matter of law because blanket 
policy providing no treatment for prisoners diagnosed with GID only after being incarcerated 
violates Eighth Amendment), vacated, 289 F. Supp. 2d 286 (N.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the 
previous order was properly decided, but defendants made admissions of material fact in their 
Motion to Reconsider that necessitated vacation). 
184 Fields was decided after a one-day bench trial on March 31, 2010. Fields v. Smith, 712 
F. Supp. 2d 830, 834 (E.D. Wis. 2010). Kosilek II was decided after a twenty-eight-day bench 
trial in the spring of 2006. Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 212, 225 (D. Mass. 2012). 
The two other cases decided following bench trials were Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d at 451, 
and Soneeya v. Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 230. 
185 See generally David W. Austin, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, 47 INT’L LAW. 
469 (2013) (discussing developments in gender identity law in 2012 including Kosilek II); 
Rena Lindevaldson, A State’s Obligation to Fund Hormonal Therapy and Sex-Reassignment 
Surgery for Prisoners Diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, 7 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 15 
(2012) (discussing Fields and Kosilek II in arguing that the Eighth Amendment does not 
require a state to pay for hormone therapy or sex-reassignment surgery); Givens, supra note 
67 (arguing that the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Fields provides the clearest and most 
reasonable assessment of why GID should constitute a serious medical need under the Eighth 
Amendment); Lila Leonard, Note, Gender Reassignment Surgery in Prisons: How the Eighth 
Amendment Guarantees Medical Treatments Not Covered by Private Insurance or Medicare 
for Law-Abiding Citizens, 11 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 626 (2014) (criticizing the decision 
in Kosilek II because it requires a higher level of care for prisoners than is typically covered 
by Medicare and private health insurance plans for law-abiding citizens); Silpa Maruri, Note, 
Hormone Therapy for Inmates: A Metonym for Transgender Rights, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 807 (2011) (discussing Fields and Kosilek I in arguing for a new legal strategy for 
transgender prisoners based on quasi-fundamental rights established in Plyler v. Doe); Ethan 
Z. Tieger, Note, Transsexual Prisoners and the Eighth Amendment: A Reconsideration of 
Kosilek v. Spencer and Why Prison Officials May Not Be Constitutionally Required to Provide 
Sex-Reassignment Surgery, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 627 (2014) (arguing that the Court’s 
opinion in Kosilek II failed to consider security concerns after the sex-reassignment surgery 
and ignored the distinction between “curative” and “adequate” care for gender dysphoria or 
GID).  
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IV. GOING FORWARD: FRAMING A NARRATIVE OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER 
THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
The opinions in Fields and Kosilek II present transgender legal 
advocates with an opportunity to develop a doctrine based on discrimination 
within the Eighth Amendment. As demonstrated in those two cases, 
discrimination may be relevant to the subjective prong of Eighth Amendment 
analysis: refusing medically necessary treatment based on political animus 
towards transgender people is not a legitimate penological interest, and thus 
constitutes deliberate indifference. For transgender prisoners seeking gender-
confirming health care, an Eighth Amendment doctrine based on 
discrimination may be the best way to fight discrimination and win cases. 
The path forward does not require a change in legal claims, but rather a 
change in factual advocacy. Using concepts of similarly situated individuals, 
pretext, and political and public controversy, legal advocates should start 
framing plaintiffs’ factual summaries around stories of discrimination. This 
concept, known as “story framing,” is one of the most important advocacy 
tools a lawyer has to sway a fact-finder.186 
In particular, legal advocates should pay close attention to the facts the 
courts found persuasive in Fields and Kosilek II. Both courts focused on the 
fact that prisoners with GID were treated differently than other prisoners with 
more socially accepted medical needs (like cancer).187 Furthermore, both 
courts relied on facts showing that denial of treatment was not related to any 
prison security benefits. In particular, the courts focused on concessions by 
the state’s security expert that denying hormone therapy does not decrease 
the risk of sexual assault188 and the fact that prison officials departed from 
the department’s established, written procedure for determining security 
risks.189 In Kosilek II, the court also focused on facts that showed that the 
MDOC Commissioner’s actual reason for denying the surgery was a fear of 
 
186 Steven Lubet, Story Framing, 74 TEMP. L. REV. 59, 61 (2001) (“The story frame may 
well be the trial lawyer’s most powerful rhetorical tool, because of its extraordinary 
effectiveness in the battle for the fact-finder’s imagination.”). 
187 Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2011) (relying on medical testimony that 
“no other state law or policy, besides Act 105 . . . prohibits prison doctors from providing 
inmates with medically necessary treatment”); Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 199 (“[s]urely, 
had the [] legislature passed a law that DOC inmates with cancer must be treated only with 
therapy and pain killers, this court would have no trouble concluding that the law was 
unconstitutional”) (quoting Fields, 653 F.3d at 556). 
188 Fields v. Smith, 712 F. Supp. 2d 830, 868 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (relying on the state’s 
security expert’s concession that it would be an “incredible stretch” to say that prohibiting 
hormone therapy would prevent sexual assaults in prison) (internal citations omitted). 
189 Kosilek II, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 240–41 (finding that prison officials departed from the 
department’s “established, written procedure” for determining security risks). 
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criticism and controversy.190 Legal advocates should look for the existence 
of similar facts to highlight in their complaints.  
As litigants frame their factual allegations around stories of 
discrimination, more courts will discuss discrimination in their opinions, and 
a set of persuasive case law will develop upon which future courts and 
litigants can rely as authority. The ultimate goal in developing this new 
Eighth Amendment doctrine would be to force prisons to change their 
policies on providing gender-confirming health care while also addressing 
the underlying discrimination against transgender people in prisons. If 
discrimination against transgender prisoners constitutes deliberate 
indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prisons will have no 
choice but to start providing gender-confirming health care to those prisoners 
who need it. 
CONCLUSION 
Obtaining access to gender-confirming health care is a serious problem 
for many transgender prisoners. In bringing these suits, transgender litigants 
need a litigation strategy that is effective not only in obtaining the health care 
they seek, but also in addressing the underlying discrimination behind prison 
policies restricting gender-confirming health care. 
The usual strategy for fighting discrimination, the Equal Protection 
Clause, is a losing strategy for transgender litigants as long as the Supreme 
Court remains unwilling to extend heightened scrutiny to new classes of 
people. Transgender prisoners have had more success litigating under the 
Eighth Amendment. Although the Eighth Amendment was not designed to 
address discrimination, the courts in Fields and Kosilek II used the Eighth 
Amendment’s deliberate indifference prong to reject the prison policies 
because of their discriminatory nature. If transgender litigants can build off 
of these cases to create an antidiscrimination doctrine within the Eighth 
Amendment, they may be able to achieve the goal of obtaining the health care 








190 See supra note 162 (discussing the evidence relied on by the court in Kosilek II to 
conclude that Dennehy’s stated security justification was pretextual, and that the actual reason 
she denied Kosilek’s request was a fear of public and political controversy). 
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